Here, we argue that what has become the standard prisoner's dilemma representation neglects the most critical aspect of free-trade agreements in the anarchic international system, namely, their security externalities. We consider these external effects explicitly. In order to do so, we construct and analyze a simple game-theoretic model. The results of this analysis demonstrate that tariff games between allies differ systematically from those played between actual or potential adversaries.
These differences imply that free trade is more likely within, rather than across, political-military alliances. However, our analysis also suggests that the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary: those that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free-trade coalitions than are their multipolar counterparts. Less credible exit threats and clearer responsibilities for alliance stability explain the advantage of a bipolar system. We test this argument using data drawn from an 80-year period beginning in 1905. The empirical analysis supports our argument. It demonstrates that alliances have a direct, statistically significant, and large effect upon bilateral trade. Moreover, it shows that on average, alliances have a much stronger effect on trade in a bipolar than in a multipolar world.2
POWER, TRADE, AND TARIFFS
Unlike many arguments about the use of economic statecraft, ours is cast at the macroeconomic rather than at the macroeconomic level. In other words, the argument we advance here is not about, for example, attempts to use economic statecraft to embargo exports of particular products or to inhibit the development of technologically advanced industries in other countries.3 Instead, it is an argument that is based upon the effect of free trade on the real income and power potential of states.
We argue that the play of power politics is an inexorable element of any agreement to open international markets because trade produces security externalities.4 These externalities arise because the source of gains from trade is the increased efficiency with which domestic resources can be employed. This increased efficiency itself frees economic resources for military uses (Baldwin 1985 The anarchic structure of the international system, in turn, compels its constituent states to attend closely to the potential military power of both allies and potential or actual adversaries. It does so because the absence of any supranational authority in the international system enables a state to resort to force at any time to achieve its goals. The probability that a state will do so depends in part upon its power, which, in turn, depends partly upon its real income.
As a consequence, the real income gains that motivate free trade are also the source of the security externalities that can either impede or facilitate it: trade with an adversary produces a security diseconomy; trade with an ally produces a positive externality. In either case, agreements to open international markets create a divergence between the private and social costs of trade.5 A socially suboptimal level of trade results, suggesting that government intervention in trade can be welfare-enhancing for the nation as a whole. Figure 1 illustrates this situation. It shows the domestic market for a good that can also be imported at its world price, Pw, which is the private marginal cost of imports. In the absence of government intervention, domestic output is Q0; domestic demand is Q3; and the amount imported is the difference between them (Q3 -Q0). Because of the external diseconomy that trade with actual or potential adversaries generates, however, the marginal social cost of imports is higher, Pw(l + t). This market failure can be eliminated by a tariff, t, which raises domestic output to Q1, lowers domestic demand to Q2, and reduces imports to Q2 -Q1 6 Government intervention in trade to correct this distortion is, in addition, a first-best policy: the market failure in this instance does not originate in a domestic distortion but arises, instead, in trade itself.7
OPTIMAL TARIFF GAMES
Successful intervention in trade to correct the security externalities associated with it depends upon the ability of a country to affect the real income of the state which is its target. Although any tariff will distort resource allocation in the target country and therefore decrease its real income, it will do so without imposing net costs on the home country only if the latter can affect its terms of trade.
Thus, in the absence of the requisite market power, a tariff will impose costs primarily upon the state that levies it. In its presence, a tariff will allow a state to increase its own real income at its adversary's expense. If a state can affect world prices, then, it can use a tariff to narrow the gap between the private and social costs of trade. Thus, a tariff can be welfaresuperior to a policy of free trade for a state in an anarchic international political system. This argument is, of course, a variant of the traditional optimal tariff argument. Its novelty inheres in the two conclusions that emerge from our discussion below: (1) tariff games between allies differ systematically from those played between adversaries; and (2) intraalliance free trade is more likely in a bipolar than in a multipolar system.
The Standard Optimal Tariff Game
The payoff matrix of the standard optimal tariff game is shown in Figure 2 . This game is a prisoner's dilemma in which T is the payoff that accrues to a state that unilaterally deploys an optimal tariff, R is the payoff that results if both states trade freely with each other, P is the return that accrues if both use optimal tariffs, and S is the payoff to unilateral free trade. As the matrix makes apparent, in a one-shot game, defection is a dominant strategy.8 As a result, the inevitable outcome of this (or of a finite) game is bilateral tariffs.9
In contrast, in an infinite game or in a game in which states assume at every period that there is some positive probability that the game will continue, a variety of Pareto-improving outcomes, including that of free trade, can be realized.10 This can occur if, for example, both states adhere to a "grim" strategy, that is, begin with free trade (i.e., cooperate); trade freely in every succeeding period if the outcome of the previous period was bilateral free trade; otherwise, deploy an optimal tariff (i.e., defect).11
This strategy will sustain cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game if the discounted sum of cooperative payoffs, R/(1 -8), is greater than the sum of the one-shot gain from defection, T, and the discounted sum of punishment payoffs, SP/(1 -a).12 Thus, cooperation can be sustained by a grim strategy if 
(T -R)/(T -P).
If this incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied, a grim strategy will enable free trade to emerge as the outcome of an infinite-horizon optimal tariff game. That this is possible not only in the abstract but also in the real world is suggested by the success of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Established in 1947, the GATT was created to, and did, enable states to avoid a replay of the tariff game that stymied trade among them in the interwar period.13
Tariff Games Between Adversaries
The payoff matrix of the standard optimal tariff game assumes that there is no difference between private and social returns to interstate trade. Life in an anarchic international system, however, effectively alters the matrix of the standard game. Because interstate trade in such a system produces security externalities, it creates a divergence between private and social returns that any utility-maximizing state will take into account when it calculates its payoffs from trade.
Thus, the payoffs a state assigns to the outcomes of any given trade game differ from those of the standard optimal tariff game. In the case of trade with an adversary, a state incurs a marginal social cost that the standard matrix does not reflect. This transforms the standard matrix as shown in Figure 3 . In each cell, the social cost that a state, i, incurs is represented as a fraction, wi, of the payoff that accrues to its adversary, j. Thus, wjjl%, for example, is the social cost or security diseconomy that accrues to state i when it trades freely with state j. This cost is represented as an increasing function of the adversary's gains from trade. This representation is based in part on what Robert Powell has described as a "very simple, highly stylized assumption about the nature of warfare": that is, the "stronger a state is economically, the more likely it is to prevail in war" (1991, 1312 When the returns from trade are adjusted to reflect its marginal social cost, the net effect is to make tariff games between adversaries more difficult to solve than is the standard optimal tariff game. Assuming that the game is iterated, free trade can be sustained in an optimal tariff game between adversaries if This condition is more difficult to satisfy than the condition that emerges from an optimal tariff game among states with independent utility functions. In a prisoner's dilemma game with payoffs of (3, 2, 1, 0), for example, the minimum discount factor that would support free trade in the standard game is .50. In the modified game (with w = .40), the analogous figure rises to .75.14 Thus, the introduction of interdependent utility functions characteristic of adversarial states makes any given prisoner's dilemma more "severe" ior difficult to solve. In addition, as w increases, the severity of the game also increases 
Tariff Games Between Allies
The gains of one state impose social costs on another only if the former is an actual or potential threat to the security of the latter. When a state trades with an ally, however, it realizes both private and social benefits. In the case of allies, the security externality that trade produces is positive. As in the case of trade between adversaries, a utility-maximizing state will take account of not only private but also social returns in calculating its payoffs from trade.
Thus, the standard matrix does not apply to this case either. The transformed prisoner's dilemma matrix is shown in Figure 4 . In each cell, the social benefit that that a state, i, realizes as a consequence of trade with an ally is represented as some fraction, w1j, of the payoff that accrues to its ally, j. This effectively internalizes the positive security externality associated with free trade between allies. The functional form is based on reasoning analogous to that which applies in the case of trade between adversaries. The applicable incentive compatibility constraint then becomes This condition is more easily satisfied than is the condition that emerges from either the standard prisoner's dilemma or the transformed game among adversaries. Using the same values assigned in the example above, free trade can be sustained among allies when the discount factor is .13. In addition, if w exceeds the larger of (T -R)/(T -S) and (D -S)/ (T -S), free trade becomes the dominant strategy equilibrium. In short, tariff games between allies are easier to solve than tariff games between actual or potential adversaries.
The Influence of Polarity
While this model suggests that all alliances will influence trade barriers, it seems clear that alliances have exerted a stronger effect after, than before, World War II. Inspection of the incentive compatibility constraint that applies to the intraallied tariff game suggests one explanation of this difference. All other things being equal, the extent to which allies trade freely with each other depends upon the discount factor, S. The discount factor is a function of the risk of exit, which, in turn, is a function of systemic polarity (Gowa 1989 The risk of exit is the threat that an ally will abandon an existing alliance to join an alternative one. For several reasons, this risk is higher in multipolar than in bipolar systems.17 First, while bipolar coalitions are the products largely of system structure, alliances in a multipolar system are the results of choice among several possible alternatives (Snyder 1984, 415) . Second, in a bipolar system, realignment is impossible for either pole. By default, alliance stability is also the exclusive responsibility of each. Neither can expect any other state to prevent the defection of an ally from within its bloc (Snyder 1984) . In a multipolar system, however, the interest in preserving alliance stability can be distributed across more than one pole. As a consequence, alliance stability can become problematic, as each pole seeks to transfer the burden of maintaining the alliance to another.
The implications of different exit risks for trade are clear. Any great-power member of a coalition in a multipolar world has strong incentives to discriminate among its allies in terms of its investment in them, because its allies confront divergent opportunity costs of exit. In contrast, the incentive to discriminate in a bipolar world is much weaker, since allies are much more uniformly and securely locked into coalitions. In a bipolar world, in other words, the gains from trade can be more easily privatized. As a consequence, investments in allies in a multipolar system are likely to be expressed in the form of discriminatory trade preferences; in a bipolar system, free trade is the more likely outcome.
In short, because the risk of exit is lower in a bipolar than in a multipolar system, the security externalities of any free-trade agreement are more likely to remain internalized within the alliances of the former than in those of the latter. As a result, allies in a multipolar system will tend to discount the future benefits accruing from open markets among them more heavily than will their bipolar counterparts. The greater stability of bipolar coalitions allows the value of future benefits to approximate present benefits more closely.
For any given structure of payoffs, then, free trade is more likely to emerge within the alliances of a bipolar than in those of a multipolar system. It is not surprising, therefore, that the effect of alliances on trade seems to have been greater after rather than before World War II. We shall now subject this and our more general hypothesis about the impact of alliances on trade to a systematic empirical test. Based on our argument, we expect that (1) fewer trade barriers will exist within than across alliances; and (2) intraalliance free trade will be more likely within bipolar than within multipolar systems. While we would prefer to test these hypotheses directly, it is not possible to do so. Reliable tariff data do not exist for all countries over the entire time span that we analyze. However, to the extent that alliance patterns explain tariffs and that tariffs, in turn, explain the volume of trade, tariffs are endogenized, and we can focus on the relationship between alliances and trade.19 As a result, we examine the effects of alliances on bilateral trade flows.
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
Ideally, we would include in our sample all major powers and their allies. However, data limitations led us to focus on trade relations among the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union,20 and Japan during the period from 1905 to 1985. Though this is clearly a limited sample, these states include most of the major powers in the international system during this period (Levy 1983; Small and Singer 1982) . Moreover, since we expect the impact of alliances on trade to be most pronounced in cases of alliances involving major powers, this analysis will offer an important, though preliminary, test of our model. 21 We also expect that bilateral alliances will affect trade flows more strongly than will multilateral alliances. While the aggregate flow of trade across a group of more than two states may be higher when these states are engaged in an alliance than when they are not, this need not imply that all bilateral trade flows among these states will be higher under these circumstances. For example, the existence of an alliance among states A, B, C, and D would be expected to produce an increase in the total trade among these states. This, however, would not necessarily lead to an increase in bilateral trade between A and B. Indeed, A and B may engage in less commerce during the course of this alliance than in the absence of the alliance (although they would be expected to offset this by trading more with C and/or D). But if our argument holds, bilateral alliances should be directly related to bilateral trade. Under these circumstances, the effects of alliances on aggregate intraalliance trade can be assessed directly by examining trade flows between the two partners. Tinbergen 1962) . In order to analyze the economic determinants of bilateral trade, we use a wellknown variant of this model, which includes the gross national product (GNP) and the population of both the importer and the exporter, as well as the geographic distance between the two states. Consistent with previous research based on this model, we expect that the nominal value of bilateral trade will be directly related to the nominal GNP of both the importer and the exporter and inversely related to the population of both the importer and exporter and to the geographic distance between them.
THE MODEL
In addition to GNP, population, and distance, we include two variables related to alliances in our model: one indicating whether a bilateral alliance exists between the trading partners and one indicating whether a multilateral alliance exists between these states. Finally, because we expect interstate wars to reduce trade among the belligerents, we also include a variable that indicates whether or not the importer and exporter are at war. Hence, our model is These findings indicate that on average, our model explains over 80% of the variation in the value of exports and that the overall fit of the model differs little across the nine years that are analyzed. Our results also indicate that the regression coefficients of GNP, population, geographic distance, and war usually point in the expected directions and are statistically significant. First, the regression coefficient of log Yi is positive in nine cases and statistically significant in eight instances; and the regression coefficient of log Yj is positive and statistically significant in all nine cases. Second, the regression coefficient of log Pi is negative in eight cases and statistically significant in seven instances; and the regression coefficient of log P is negative in nine cases and statistically significant in eight instances. Third, the regression coefficient of log D.-is negative in eight cases and statistically significant in five instances. Finally, the regression coefficient of log War,, is negative and statistically significant in one out of two cases.
These results also confirm the hypothesis that alliances are directly related to the value of exports. The regression coefficient of log BAij is positive in six out of nine cases and statistically significant in five instances; and the regression coefficient of log MA,, is positive and statistically significant in six out of eight cases. Further, the mean of the nine regression coefficients of log BAiJ is about 1.09 and (assuming that these regression coefficients are statistically independent) the standard error of the mean is about .15.31 The mean of the eight regression coefficients of log MA is about .61, and the standard error of the mean is about .16.32 On average, therefore, the relationships between bilateral alliances and multilateral alliances, on the one hand, and bilateral trade on the other seem to be direct and statistically significant.
Moreover, the quantitative impacts of both bilateral and multilateral alliances on the predicted value of bilateral trade are substantial. Even if the mean of the regression coefficients of log BAij was two standard errors less than 1.09, a change from the absence of a bilateral alliance to the existence of such an alliance would more than double the predicted value of exports.33 And even if the mean of the regression coefficients of log MAj was two standard errors less than .61, a change from the absence of a multilateral alliance to the existence of such an alliance would increase the predicted value of exports by more than one-third.34 As expected, the system's structure influences the strength and the magnitude of the effect of alliances on trade. The means of the regression coefficients of log BAij and log MA,, have been substantially larger during periods of bipolarity than during periods of multipolarity; and the differences between these means are statistically significant (for log BA., t = 6.26, p < .005; for log MAij, t = 2.34, p < .05). Thus, our results indicate that on average, the magnitude of the effects of alliances on trade has been considerably more pronounced during bipolar periods than during multipolar periods.
There is also some support for our hypothesis that bilateral alliances exert larger effects on trade than multilateral alliances, although the evidence is weaker than expected. When all years in Tables 1 are considered, the mean of the regression coefficients of log BAij is almost twice as large as the mean of the regression coefficients of log MAij, but the difference between these means is not statistically significant. When only bipolar periods are examined, the mean of the regression coefficients of log BAij is substantially larger than the mean of the regression coefficients of log MAj; and the difference between these means is statistically significant (t = 4.50, p < .005). But when only multipolar periods are analyzed, the mean of the regression coefficients of log MA,, is somewhat larger than the mean of the regression coefficients of log BAij; and, although the difference between these means is not statistically significant, this result is clearly at odds with our hypothesis. Hence, the extent to which our hypothesis concerning the effects of different types of alliances on trade is supported seems to depend in large measure on system structure. enhance the influence of alliances on trade? Second, does the omission of certain variables that might be expected to influence both alliance patterns and trade flows account for the observed relationship between alliances and bilateral commerce?
THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS

In addition to estimating the effects of alliances on trade, it is also important to analyze the robustness of the results in
Estimates of the Parameters Excluding the Soviet Union
It is possible that including the Soviet Union in our sample may have exaggerated the impact of alliances on trade (in Table 1 ). The Soviet Union had both a command and a relatively autarkic economy during most of the twentieth century. It also concluded few alliances with other major powers in our sample after World War I. Thus, the strength of the observed relationship between alliances and trade might be due to the composition of our sample. In order to determine whether this is the case, ordinary least squares estimates of the parameters in equation 1 were obtained for those dyads that did not involve the Soviet Union. These results (and auxiliary regressions based on these results) indicated that unlike our findings in Table 1 , there was often considerable multicollinearity among log Yi, log Y. log Pi, and log P. when dyads involving the Soviet Union were excluded from our analysis. One solution to this type of problem is to combine some of the explanatory variables (Fox 1991,  15-16) . We, therefore, focus on the effects of the nominal per capita GNP (which is expressed as Y/P) of both the importer and the exporter, as well as distance and alliances, on nominal exports. This specification of our model is as follows: Table 2 (with outliers deleted).35 These results indicate that on average, our model continues to explain about 80%7o of the variation in exports and that the signs of the regression coefficients of per capita GNP and geographic distance are in the expected directions. In every case, the regression coefficients of log (Y/P)i and log (Y/P)j are positive and statistically significant; and the regression coefficient of log Dii is negative and statistically significant in seven out of eight instances.
Of particular interest is the fact that the effects of both bilateral and multilateral alliances on bilateral trade are much the same, regardless of whether or not the Soviet Union is excluded from our sample of states. In no case does the sign of the regression coefficient of either log BAij or log MAj in Table 1 change when the Soviet Union is deleted; and in only one case (log MA1j in 1938) does the level of statistical significance of the regression coefficient of either log BA.-or log MA1j in Table 1 change when the composition of our sample of states is altered. Moreover, the means of the regression coefficients of both log BAij (1.09) and log MAij (.58) are virtually identical to those based on the results in Table 1. On average, therefore, the relationships between both bilateral and multilateral alliances and bilateral trade continue to be direct and statistically signifi-. cant. It should also be noted that on average, the magnitude of the effects of bilateral alliances on trade continues to be larger than that of multilateral alliances and that on average, the magnitude of the effects of both bilateral and multilateral alliances on bilateral trade continues to be significantly larger during periods of bipolarity than during periods of multipolarity.
The Effects of Omitted Variables
We now turn to the issue of whether our results in Table 1 In order to determine whether the observed relationship between alliances and trade is due to regime type, a dummy variable was included in equation 1 that equalled 1 if both states i and j were democracies in year t -1, and 0 otherwise, based on Doyle's (1986) data. Our results indicated that the sign of this regression coefficient varied substantially from year to year and that it was statistically significant in only one case. Moreover, the size and level of statistical significance of the remaining regression coefficients in equation 1 continued to be much the same as in Table 1 .
Clearly, we are not suggesting that PTAs, military disputes, and regime type do not influence bilateral trade flows at all. But these factors do not seem to account for the observed relationship between alliances and trade among major powers during the twentieth century. Nor does the composition of the sample: our findings are also quite robust with respect to whether the Soviet Union is included in the analysis. Thus, while tentative, our results indicate that bilateral trade flows between major powers tend to be considerably higher when they are allies than when they are not.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that a free-trade policy can be suboptimal for states in an anarchic international system. Under some conditions, an effort to induce trade to follow the flag can be welfare-enhancing. The results of our empirical analysis support the implications of our argument about the relationship between alliances and trade. They show that alliances exert a direct, statistically significant, and large effect on bilateral trade flows. They also show that the effects of alliances vary. Bilateral alliances sometimes influence trade flows more strongly than do multilateral alliances; and alliances embedded in bipolar systems 87, No. 2 have stronger effects upon trade than do their counterparts in multipolar systems.
The argument we develop here also suggests that there may be other sources of cross-alliance variation that our empirical analysis could not detect. One plausible source is differences across alliances with respect to the gains that would accrue from free trade and its associated externalities. According to the tenets of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of international trade, for example, gains from trade and differences in relative factor endowments are directly related. Thus, this model implies that allies with very different factor endowments will confront stronger incentives to trade freely with each other than will allies with more similar endowments.
The weight a state assigns to its ally will also affect the magnitude of the security externality that free trade generates. Cross-alliance variations in wij might occur, for example, because of differences in the probability of war, the technology of weapons production, or the need (if any) for an ex ante coordination of forces. In addition, the magnitude of the external effects of trade depends upon the transaction costs of opening borders to trade. These costs might vary as a consequence, for example, of whether an alliance has been given formal institutional expression (Keohane 1984; Snidal 1985) .
Because of these and other possible sources of cross-alliance variation, it is clear that we have not offered an exhaustive analysis of the impact of alliances on trade. Nonetheless, we have established the conditions under which it makes sense for states to attempt to tie trade to the flag. In addition, we show that alliances have influenced bilateral trade flows not only after, but also before, 1945. In doing so, we suggest that the end of the Cold War will precipitate changes in the play of power politics both in the political-military sphere and in the pattern of international trade. 1. Disagreement continues about the source of this preference ranking, however. Some attribute it to the public good character of international trade (e.g., Kindleberger 1973); others attribute it to the ability of states to exercise monopoly or monopsony power in world markets (Conybeare 1984) . Still others contend that the trade game can be a coordination game (Snidal 1985 3. The voluminous literature on economic statecraft at the macroeconomic level that now exists partly explains our decision to focus this analysis at the macroeconomic level. The decision, however, was also the product of the almost insuperable obstacles that confront any attempts at embargo, probably the most common form of macroeconomic statecraft. For a good discussion, see Bayard, Pelzman, and Lopez 1983. 4. Externalities are uncompensated costs or benefits that an agent inflicts or confers on third parties.
Notes
5. This divergence arises because those whose actions generate externalities have no incentive to take these external effects into account. Thus, if an individual's actions produce diseconomies, for example, he will engage in them to a socially suboptimal extent. For a more detailed explanation, see Yeager and Tureck 1983/84, 661.
6. We use tariffs here as a substitute for several forms of government intervention in trade. Because of constraints imposed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, government intervention in trade now usually takes the form of nontariff barriers. As long as the home country captures the scarcity rents that accrue from trade barriers, the form in which intervention occurs does not affect the argument presented here.
7. The theory of the second best applies to most national security arguments for government intervention in trade: the latter usually imposes higher costs on national welfare than do policies that target the distortion directly. For example, if production in an import-competing industry is judged inadequate on national security grounds, the Pareto-optimal policy is a production subsidy (Corden 1986 ). The general principle, as Deardorff and Stern observe, "is that trade intervention, by introducing two distortions rather than one, may succeed in solving one problem but only at the same time that it causes another. Trade policy is like doing acupuncture with a fork: no matter how carefully you insert one prong, the other is likely to do damage" (1987, 39).
8. That is, a player is better off defecting regardless of what the other player does.
9. If incomplete information of a specific kind exists in a finite prisoner's dilemma game, however, it is possible for mutual cooperation to emerge on at least some plays of the game. See Kreps et al. 1982. 10. As the Folk theorem states, if the horizon is infinite and the actors are very patient, any individually rational outcome can be sustained (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) .
11. In a context in which deviations are perfectly observable, maximal punishment makes sense, because it never occurs on the equilibrium path. It is, therefore, costless (Tirole 1988, 252) . Moreover, unlike Tit for Tat, a grim strategy is subgame perfect (i.e., it is rational for the players to follow the specified strategies if any defection occurs) (Rasmusen 1989, 91 It is not, however, renegotiation-proof (i.e., if one player defects and the players have the opportunity to renegotiate, they will abandon the punishment strategy in favor of one that confers higher payoffs.) A Pareto-perfect or weakly renegotiation-proof strategy is a "penance" strategy: begin with cooperation; if a deviation occurs, the deviator cooperates and the other player defects; the players then revert to cooperation (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, 179-82) . We use a grim strategy here for two reasons: (1) it is more accessible; and more importantly, (2) our results do not change if a penance strategy is used.
12. The discount factor, 8, is "the value in present payoff units of one payoff unit to be received one period from the present." It reflects both the rate of time preference, p, and the probability that the game will end, 0. The discount factor is (1 -0)/(1 + p) (Rasmusen 1989, 90) . Thus, the discounted sum of an infinite series of payoffs, x, received at the beginning of each period is: (x) (1 -0)1(1 + p) It should also be pointed out that in some cases, exports by state i to state j are not available. However, in these cases, it is usually possible to find data on imports by j from i. Since these values should be equal, we convert imports in j's currency into U.S. dollars and use these data as measures of exports from i to j. When we do so, we should adjust the data to reflect the fact that the value of imports reported sometimes includes transportation costs. We do not do so, however, because our sources do not uniformly report on whether or not import data are net of transportation costs.
23. 26. Throughout this study, Small and Singer's (1969) data on alliances are used. We consider any defense pact, neutrality or nonaggression pact, or entente that is listed by Small and Singer to be an alliance. Because the purpose of Small and Singer's study was to explain war, they excluded-all wartime alliances from their data. As they themselves observed, however, if their data are used for other purposes, the list of alliances should be amended correspondingly (p. 262). Thus, we also include as allies any states that fought on the same side of any interstate war, as listed by either Levy (1983) 27. In this study, any war that is listed by either Levy (1983) or Small and Singer (1982) is analyzed. It might be expected that wars would exert a contemporaneous, as well as a lagged, effect on trade. Since both of the wars considered in this study were being waged in year t, as well as year t -1, any contemporaneous effect these wars might have on trade will be captured by our model. Further, it should be noted that only one war (the Changkufeng War, 1938) would be added to our list of wars if we measured this variable in year t, rather than year t -1.
28. While this strategy avoids potential problems of simultaneity, it is, of course, possible that the relationship between trade and alliances is multidirectional. Although it would also be useful to assess the effect of trade on alliance patterns, developing an adequate model of alliances is clearly beyond our scope here.
29. Outliers were identified based on the value of studentized residuals (see Fox 1991, 25- As a result, the proportional increase in the predicted value of exports by state i if there exists a bilateral alliance between states i and j (rather than no bilateral alliance between them) is equal to eB6 minus one. Since the mean of B6 in Table 1 (1) all of the states in our sample that were GATT members in 1954 (year t -1) were also NATO members; and (2) for balance-of-payments reasons, several European members of the GATT had imposed quotas on imports from the dollar area.
